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VIRGINIA ABOLISHES LOCALITY RULE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE
The Virginia General Assembly, in recognition of a modem medi-
cal society, has abolished' the presumption which favors the appli-
cation of a "same or similar ' 2 locale standard to determine the
requisite care of a health care provider.3 The "same or similar"
standard has been used consistently since 19181 in malpractice liti-
gation and, more recently, in proceedings before the medical mal-
practice review panels in Virginia.5 This standard was first adopted
by statute in 1977,6 and though it appeared to intend a broader
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 1979) states as follows:
A. In any proceeding before a medical malpractice review panel or in any action
against a physician, dentist, nurse, hospital or other health care provider to recover
damages alleged to have been caused by medical malpractice where the acts or omis-
sions so complained of are alleged to have occurred in this Commonwealth, the stan-
dard of care by which the acts of omissions are to be judged shall be that degree of
skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the field of prac-
tice or specialty in this Commonwealth and the testimony of an expert witness, other-
wise qualified, as to such standard of care, shall be admitted, provided, however, that
the standard of care in the locality or in similar localities in which the alleged act or
omission occurred shall be applied if any party shall prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the health care services and health care facilities available in the locality
and the customary practices in such locality or similar localities give rise to a standard
of care which is more appropriate than a Statewide standard.
B. In any action for damages resulting from medical malpractice, any issue as to
the standard of care to be applied shall be determined by the jury, or the court trying
the case without a jury.
2. See notes 13-24 infra, and accompanying text.
3. Defined as:
1. 'Health care provider' means a person, corporation, facility or institution li-
censed by this Commonwealth to provide health care or professional services as a
physician or hospital, dentist, pharmacist, registered or licensed practical nurse, opto-
metrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, physical therapy assistant, clini-
cal psychologist or a nursing home as defined in § 54-900 of the Code of Virginia except
those nursing institutions conducted by and for those who rely upon treatment by
spiritual means alone through prayer in accordance with a recognized church or reli-
gious denominatibn, or an officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and
scope of his employment.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
4. Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
5. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1977). For an excellent discussion of the
medical review board legislation, see Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review
Panel and Some Questions It Raises, 11 U. RiCH. L. Rav. 51 (1976).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12:1 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (repealed by enactment of VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
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standard than the local standard, 7 it was in fact interpreted as a
clear statutory adoption of the Virginia case law 2:ule.8 The new
statute, repealing the 1977 statute, adopts the statewide standard
of care' as the presumption which now can only be rebutted by a
"preponderance of the evidence"' 0 that, in consideration of local
customs and practice, another standard would be "more appropri-
ate.
1
')
In medical malpractice litigation, expert testimony is required
concerning the applicable standard of care.2 The Virginia Supreme
Court, in 1918, defined what was to become the test for that particu-
lar standard. In Hunter v. Burroughs, '3 the court adopted the defen-
dant's contention that the standard to be applied was that of "like
specialists in good standing in the same or similar localities as
7. The 1977 statute could have been read as rejecting the presumption calling for the local
rule but, in reality, the use of the local rule was inevitable.
In any action against a physician, dentist, nurse, hospital or other health care provi-
der to recover damages alleged to have been caused by medical malpractice where the
acts or omissions so complained of are alleged to have occurred in this Commonwealth,
the standard of care by which the acts or omissions are to be judged shall be that degree
of skill and diligence practiced by a reasonably prudent practitioner in the field of
practice or specialty in this Commonwealth; provided, however, that the standard of
care in the locality or in similar localities in which the alleged act or omission occurred
may be applied if, after considering the health care services and health care facilities
available in such locality and the customary practice in such locality or other similar
localities, it is determined that the local standard of care is more appropriate than a
statewide standard.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12:1 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
8. See 11 U. RICH. L. Rzv., supra at 54.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
10. Defined in Virginia case law as follows:
The weight or preponderance of evidence is its power to convince the tribunal which
has the determination of the fact, of the actual truth of the proposition to be proved.
After the evidence has been weighed, that proposition is proved by a preponderance
of the evidence if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual
belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the
tribunal, not withstanding any doubts that may still linger there.
Northern Virginia Power Co. v. Bailey, 194 Va. 464, 471, 73 S.E.2d 425 (1952) (quoting
Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825. 827 (1940)).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
12. Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 298, 8 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1940) (citing Hunter v. Burroughs,
123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918)). See also Morgan v. Schlanger, 374 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1967).
For an example of expert testimony and instructions in applying the locality rule, see Carroll
v. Richardson, 201 Va. 157, 160-63, 110 S.E.2d 193, 194-97 (1959).
13. 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360 (1918).
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[the] defendant."'" Although the word "specialists" was used in
the Hunter test, it was not clear until 1924, in Fox v. Mason, 5 that
the local rule would be the same with regard to specialists.' Courts
subsequently applied the rule to dentists," psychiatrists,' 8 anesthe-
siologists,'9 and gynecologists."0 The local standard has evolved into
a more clearly defined model over the past century of use. It is clear
today that a doctor "impliedly represents that he is keeping abreast
of the [latest] literature"2' and that the quality of his care will be
judged as to the "state of medical science at the time. 2 2 An excep-
tion to the rule has been the "school of practice" limitation, which
has allowed the particular defendant who adopts a defined theory
to be judged only according to the standards applicable to that
particular philosophy.2 The general rule, however, is that stated in
Hunter, meaning that a doctor cannot be found guilty of malprac-
tice without expert testimony given by a doctor with a similar prac-
tice and from the same or a similar community. This standard has
also been employed by federal courts when applying Virginia law. 24
The locality rule was developed when communication within the
medical community was very limited. The immediate access to
newly published medical journals was restricted primarily to medi-
cal personnel in large, urban areas.2 The quest for protection of
14. Id. at 131, 96 S.E. at 366.
15. 139 Va. 667, 124 S.E. 405 (1924), overruled on other grounds, 160 Va. 303, 168 S.E. 353
(1933).
16. Id. at 671, 124 S.E. at 406.
17. Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va. 248, 6 S.E.2d 661 (1940); United Dentists v. Bryan, 158 Va.
880, 164 S.E. 554 (1932).
18. White v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Va. 1965).
19. Whitfield v. Whittaker Mem. Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (1969).
20. Varga v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1969), affd 422 F.2d 1333 (4th Cir.
1970); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976).
21. Reed v. Church, supra at 292, 8 S.E.2d at 288. See also Hall v. Ferry, 235 F. Supp.
821, 826-27 (E.D. Va. 1969).
22. Alexander v. Hill, supra at 252, 6 S.E.2d at 663.
23. "[A] physician who subscribes to a particular theory, albeit a minority one, will
generally be tested against the standards applicable to good practice within that theory."
Shepherd, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Virginia, 21 W. & L. L. Rv. 212, 218-19 (1964)
(citing Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285 (1940)).
24. See Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1968); Hicks v. United States, 368
F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966); Lawrence v. Nutter, 203 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1953); Hall v. Ferry, 235
F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Va. 1969); Trueman v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. La. 1960).
25. Medical Malpractice-Status of the Locality Rule, 23 DEF. L.J. 178, 181 (1974).
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rural doctors, in light of the great need for their services led to the
rule's development. Some authorities contend, perhaps with some
justification, that rural communities attract lower caliber physi-
cians, with less training and experience.26 In Virginia courts, though,
the general justification is that the care and skill required is directly
related to the conditions surrounding the particular treatment.
"Due care in a lumber camp might be gross negligence at Johns
Hopkins." Despite the advent of modern transportation and com-
munication systems, it is not inconceivable that a doctor in a remote
part of Virginia may not have access to sophisticated and extremely
expensive equipment that is common place in metropolitan areas.2
The Virginia Supreme Court, in more recent cases, acknowledged
that the reasons for the locality rule are outdated, but indicated that
a long tradition of acceptance and reliance justified. its continued
recognition.29 Though the local standard was never seriously ques-
tioned, in practice it has led to some inconsistent results.30 The
courts have consistently invalidated testimony by out-of-state ex-
perts"' while applying a similar locality standard which has ranged
from what appears to be a national, 2 or large regional area," to a
truly local standard.
26. 40 FORDHAM L. Rv. 435, 438 (1971) (citing Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880),
overruled by Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968)).
27. Fox v. Mason, supra at 671, 124 S.E. at 406.
28. See generally 23 DEF. L.J., supra at 185.
29. The Virginia 'same or similar community' standard is imbedded in the jurispru-
dential law of this Commonwealth; it has been long relied upon by lower courts, the
legal and medical professions, and the public. If for no other reason, we reject the
challenge for change because basic concepts of stare decisis dictate maintenance of the
established law.
Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 652, 222 S.E.2d 783, 789 (1976). For a case showing Virginia's
strict adherence to the local rule in a separate area, see Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490,
201 S.E.2d 798 (1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 902 (1974) (applying a local standard for obscenity).
30. In a 1948 case, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a doctor's conviction based upon a
general practitioner's testimony, in which he acknowledged inexperience in the questioned
area; even though an eminent surgeon testified favorably for the defendant. This result
effectuated a vigorous dissent. Vann v. Harden, 187 Va. 555, 47 S.E.2d 314 (1948).
31. It appears extremely difficult for an out-of-state expert to prove that his community is
"similar" to the defendant's without having practiced in the defendant's own community.
See generally Little v. Cross, 217 Va. 71, 225 S.E.2d 387 (1976); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645,
222 S.E.2d 783 (1976).
32. See Whitfield v. Whittaker Mem. Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 180, 169 S.E.2d 563, 566 (1969).
The standard applied was considered the standard applicable "in any community."
33. See Carroll v. Richardson, 201 Va. 157, 110 S.E.2d 193 (1959) (Tidewater area).
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The substantial change in society since the innovation of the rule
has been recognized by the Virginia court, but the court felt that
any major change in such a well-established rule "should not be
accomplished by the mere brush of the judicial pen."34 Today, medi-
cal journals are widely circulated and every doctor is expected to
subscribe to his particular specialty's publications. 5 With the
abundance of modern transportation, a doctor may easily attend
any number of the seminars put on by medical societies throughout
the country." Medical schools are now required to have standard-
ized curricula and the licensing of medical personnel is similarly
standardized, 3 making it less likely that a doctor in a rural area
would have lesser skills or qualifications than his counterpart in the
metropolitan area. Moreover the medical profession, through re-
search, discovers new medications and techniques requiring an ever
increasing educational burden upon all physicians to remain in-
formed.
The local standard has generated its own peculiar problems.
There has been, and will continue to be, a "notorious unwillingness"
by doctors to testify in a proceeding against a fellow doctor .3 This
situation has been termed the "conspiracy of silence."4 The obvious
peer pressure invoked in the medical community, accompanied by
the "scare tactics of malpractice insurance carriers and medical
societies," have put an excessive burden upon the plaintiff-victim
who is required to furnish expert testimony. The added disadvan-
tage is that if an expert is found to testify to the local standard, it
would be extremely hard for him to be impartial.4 2 The geographical
34. Bly v. Rhoads, supra at 652, 222 S.E.2d at 789. See also note 29, supra.
35. 23 DEF. L.J., supra at 181.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 184.
38.*Id. at 185.
39. 35 ATLA L.J. 60, 60 (1974).
40. 23 DEF. L.J., supra at 186.
41. 35 ATLA L.J., supra at 60.
42. 11 U. RICH. L. REv., supra at 51. Several suggestions have been drafted that would allow
courts to circumvent the "conspiracy of silence." Examples include: 1) relaxation of locality
rule, 2) relax rules of evidence so as to place burden on defendant doctor as to standard of
care, 3) relax evidentiary rules as to admitting medical treatises, 4) establishing negligence
through use of defendant's own admissions, 5) expand doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and 6)
invoking theory of informed consent. 35 ATLA L.J., supra at 61 (cited authorities omitted).
For an explanation of Virginia law on admittance of medical treatises, see Lawrence v.
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limitations imposed upon the selection of expert witnesses, by the
local rule, is clearly loosened by Virginia's adoption of the statewide
standard. However, there are valid arguments that a national stan-
dard would not only do away with needless boundaries, but would
also be more consistent with the standard of care in ordinary negli-
gence cases-the reasonable prudent man under the same circum-
stances. The Virginia legislature's adoption of the statewide stan-
dard, however, is not without some justification in view of the broad
national standard. Many states have significant variances in their
laws concerning drug control, "good Samaritan" situations, insur-
ance coverage, medical licensing, and malpractice, which possibly
justifies the more limited standard.44 In fact, the broader area en-
compassed by the statewide standard will, in all probability, pro-
vide a sufficient pool for plaintiff's selection and result in a standard
of care equal to the national standard. 5
The new statute will require judicial interpretation in the future.
There is no precedent as to requirements of a preponderance of the
evidence in medical malpractice cases.48 It may eventually result in
a restatement of all the reasons for the old rule in attempts to invoke
its use. If this results in summarily allowing a local standard of care
to be applied, the legislature may be required to repeal the proviso
to the statute, allowing local customs and practices to be considered
only in determining the actual statewide standard. It is not clear
what effect the statute will have upon the "forgotten sponge" cases
that invoke the application of res ipsa loquitur,47 but. it would ap-
pear to have little or no effect. The "school of practice" test, found
in some Virginia cases, 8 is not mentioned in the new statute, and
serious questions may arise as to the standard to be applied when
there are two different theories relating to the same treatment.
Should a doctor be penalized because he adheres to a new, innova-
Nutter, 203 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1953); 21 W. & L. L. Rv., supra at 229. For an explanation
of Virginia law on res ipsa loquitur, the "forgotten sponge" cases, see, Dietze v. King, 184 F.
Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960); Easterly v. Walton, 208 Va. 214, 156 S.E.2d 787 (1967); Henley
v. Mason, 154 Va. 381, 153 S.E. 653 (1930); 21 W. & L. L. Rv., supra at 225.
43. Comment, 7 U.S.F.L. Rv. 163, 174-75 (1972).
44. Id. at 174.
45. Id.
46. See note 10, supra.
47. See cases cited in note 42, supra.
48. See note 23, supra.
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tive school of thought that may in fact be the national standard,
when Virginia doctors use a more outdated, but well-tested
practice? The statute can be interpreted so as to not totally bar the
national standard. The proviso with regard to the local standard
merely requires that after consideration of local practice, a standard
of care "more appropriate" than the statewide standard may be
used. If it is concluded that a national standard is "more appropri-
ate," then it may similarly be used, even if in conflict with statewide
practice.
One final problem will have to be cleared up, either judicially or
by statute. The original House bill provided that the expert witness,
"who is familiar with the standard of care within the Common-
wealth in the field of practice or specialty at issue shall be admissi-
ble to prove whether or not the acts or omissions complained of
occurred" and the standard of care to be applied." In the Senate-
approved bill, and in the report of the conferees which resulted in
the final bill, the provision with respect to expert testimony was
deleted." Whether the deletion was intended to continue existing
practice, or to allow the requisite proof by other than expert testi-
mony, is at the moment unanswered.
John Y. Richardson, Jr.
49. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute for House Bill No. 1985 (Proposed by the
House Committee for Courts of Justice) (emphasis not in original). The House agreed to the
committee substitute and passed the bill on February 7, 1979 by a vote of 92-4.
50. The Senate passed the bill with its own amendments on February 22, 1979 by a vote
of 36-3. On February 23, 1979 the Senate amendments were rejected by the House unani-
mously and subsequently unanimously insisted upon by the Senate. The Senate proposal was
similar to the final bill with the wording, between "or specialty in this Commonwealth" and
"provided, however," being deleted. (See note 1, supra). On February 24 the conference report
was approved by the House, 83-0 and the Senate, 32-3. The bill was signed by the Governor
on March 21, 1979.
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